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Date: Sat,  9 Dec 89 01:33:37 -0500 (EST)
Subject: SPACE Digest V10 #325

SPACE Digest                                     Volume 10 : Issue 325

Today's Topics:
		    HR2674 Hearings (part 7 of 6)
		Re: Manned vs Unmanned Mission to Mars
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Date: 8 Dec 89 18:19:51 GMT
From: cs.utexas.edu!samsung!shadooby!sharkey!itivax!vax3!aws@tut.cis.ohio-state.edu  (Allen W. Sherzer)
Subject: HR2674 Hearings (part 7 of 6)

Here is James Bennett's testamony on the HR2674 hearings.
Thanks to the same people (Catherine and Tihamer) who help
get this information.

As I said, the next step is to get the bill to 'mark up' so
it can go for a vote. Congressman Nelson is dragging his 
feet according to some aids I have spoken to. If you would
like to see this bill as law, please write Nelson and ask
him to sent the bill to mark up.

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Testimony of
James Bennett
President, American Rocket Company
before the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications
U.S. House of Representatives
November 9, 1989

To begin, I would like to thank the Chairman and members of this
Committee for the opportunity of presenting my company's views.
The commercialization of space has attracted increasing
attention over the past ten years.  As we close this decade it
is worthwhile to review the progress of commercialization of
space transportation, in order to better set the agenda for
American commercial space in the 1990's.

At the end of the 1970's, I and my entrepreneurial colleagues
had begun to turn from planning on the use of Space Shuttle
flight opportunities for commercial space ventures, to
re-examining the entire infrastructure for commercial space
operations.  I, along with a number of other entrepreneurs,
concluded that the Space Shuttle would not by itself provide
sufficientlyu low cost or readily available flight opportunities
to permit commercial space applications.

Furthermore, we concluded that the current structure for
development and operation of space transportation services in
the United States would never provide such service.  Unlike air,
sea, or ground transportation, the basic decisions in
development and operation of space transportation were driven by
political criteria.  In order to create the same successful
transportation systems as exist in terrestrial environments we
must substitute market forces for political criteria in the
development and operation of space transportation systems.  I,
along with other entrepreneurs set out to encourage this
transition.  By founding entrepreneurial ventures to create a
truly commercial space transportation industry, we could take
advantage of the business opportunities to be gained therein.

This effort createtd enormous challenges for entrepreneurs,
established corporations, and government agencies alike.
Previously, industry had served as a contractor to the
government, building and operating space launchers to rigid
government specifications and submitting to lengthy cost
documentation in a vain attempt to keep costs under control.
Contractors had no effective incentive to implement innovations
in vehicle manufacturing and flight operations.  Competing
concepts were not tried out in flight, nor were users of space
transportation given effective choice among varied launch
systems.

No mechanism existed to guarantee public safety or compliance
with international obligations, other than combersome internal
goverment procedures evolved to control contractor activities.
No regulatory agency was designated with oversight of the
industry.  There was no process to guard the interests of the
American space industry in international trade negotiation
areanas.  There existed no set of industry standards for launch
vehicles; this function was filleld less flexibly by the
government specification systems.  There was no mechanism to
permit private companies to use the national launch and test
facilities on a regular and predictable basis.

To use an analogy, the space industry was like a child born
without its natural life support systems, growing up dependent
on the artificial support system of government internal
procedures.  In order to create a healthy, viable space
transportation industry, a parallel set of institutions typical
of a normal industry would have to be built up and put in place
as the industry developed, transferring functions previously
done by government internal procedures to normal industry
functions.  This is the standard by whjich existing measures
such as the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 and the
Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, and proposed
measures such as the Space Launch Services Purchase Act should
be evaluated.

The challenge for the space transportation industry has been to
assume the risk of launch vehicle development and operation,
establish service, and enter a highly competitive international
market.  The challenge for the Federal agencies has been to
adapt from the old role as controller of all activity to new
roles as civil regulator, as service provider on the national
ranges, and as customer for the purchase of launch services.

How do the government's efforts measure up as of today?

The first measure, the 1984 Act, has been largely a success.
Due to it, the industry is making the transition to a normal
regulatory regime, where hazardds to the public and the
environment are judged on a basis comparable to other commercial
activities.  The industry is able to understand and predict the
regulatory environment with reasonable certainty, and the
regulatory regime seems to be developing with sufficient
flexibility to accommodate new and innovative vehicle designs
without undue burden or regulatory uncertainty.  Of course, it
is important that future developments unfold in close
consultation with industry, so that elements of regulation such
as inspection regimes, insurance requirements, and launch site
licensing do not become pretexts for expanding bereaucracy or
self-serving perpetuation of functions.

In the specific case of AMROC's recent flight test attempt, the
licensing provisions were fully exercised, adn it appears that
the public's interest in safety, protection of taxpayer's
assets, environment, and international obligations were
appropriately guarded.  The requirements of the Commercial Space
Launch Act, as administered by the Department of Transportation,
did at no time become a pacing item in AMROC's launch schedule.

As the test did result in damage to the vehicle on the pad, it
provides a good opportunity for evaluation of the effectiveness
of the procedures for protection of government property at
Vandenberg Air Force Base.  The Department of Transportation
required AMROC to carry twelve million dollars of third-party
liability insurance, and a million dollars of insurance against
damage to government property.  As the preliminary estimate of
damage to government property is one thousand dollars, it
appears that the coverage required was adaquate.

Other aspects of the regulatory regime require futher review.
The question of radio frequency assignments remains unsettled:
It is important that, as the commercial industry transitions
from use of solely goverment frequencies to joint use or sole
use of space communications frequencies, U.S.  industry dose not
become penalized or burdened by the technical costs inherent to
that transition, and that the costs be spread fairly throughout
industry and government.  The environmental process for launch
sites needs to be reviewed to assure that industry is treated
consistent with other industrial sectors, moving perhaps to
uniform application of the airport-like system used by the
Department of Transportation.  In particular, environmental
review process for minor activities at the launch site area
needs to be streamlined for commercial operations.

Turning to the government's role as facilities provider, we
found that the general principles laid out in the 1984
legislation have served as an excellent basis for acess to the
national ranges.  However, as can be expected in a transition
from a familiar role and relationship to a new an unfamiliar
one, many problems have arisen in the process of establishing a
working relationship.  The lengthy process required to produce
an acceptable range use agreement with the government created a
cloud over the head of the U.S.  launch industry for the past
five years.  Greater involvement of the launch companies in the
preliminary drafting of agreements might reduce the time
required to reach agreement.  The clarifications made in the
1988 Launch Acts Amendments in the area of insurance and pricing
of facilities have been helpful in establishing this working
relationship.

Although the existing Agreement has permitted this relationship
to begin, it must continue to evolve through experience.  We
must recognize that the terms and conditions of a launch
service's access to launch sites is an important competitive
issue.  Uncertainty over these terms of access by U.S.
companies and their customers has been an
issue exploited by our foreign competitors.

Three areas which we would single out for attention are: 
1. Access to the launch site by international customer personell,
2. Improved security of tenure on base and protection from
pre-emption, and 3. A re-evaluation of the language of the 1984
legislation prohibiting subsidy.  This has been misinterpretted
frequently in dealings between the range operators and the
commercial launch industry.  This language should be restated as
an explicit prohibition of direct operating subsidy or tranfer
of funds from the government to launch operators.  The current
language has encouraged hair-splitting over what percent of
existing base operations cost can be attributed to commerical
activities.  The interpretation we suggest would be closer to
the understanding of subsidy used in international trade talks;
this interpretation should be adopted uniformly throughout the
government.

Turning to government's role as a customer for launch services,
this is an area where substantial progress is still required.
The principle of purchase of commercial launch services is
clear: Whenever a good or service is available from the private
sector on a commercial basis, the government ought to buy such
for its needs.  This is longstanding policy, and good sense as
well.  As launch service becomes available on a commercial
basis, government should take advantage of it to meet its own
needs wherever possible.  Obviously, there will always be
missions where security needs or other highly specialized
requirements will dictate using a government-operated system
procured on the current basis.  The proposed legislation, HR
2674, appropriately provides for such exceptions.

However, they should become exceptions.  Just as the government
has benefitted by adapting its transportation needs on land, air
and sea to take advantage of the available transportation
provided by the private sector, there are many payloads and
missions which can be adapted to take advantage of the growing
set of options now available or being developed by the private
sector.

Much has been said about the need for stringent government
oversight of its launch services procurements for reliability,
payload success, and cost control.  For payloads such as
Galileo, this argument may have some validity.  For the middle
range of payloads, equivalent to the average commercial
communications satellite, the types of terms, conditions, and
protections customary in commercial launches should be adequate
to protect the government's interests.  For the growing class of
smaller, less complicated, and less expensive satellites, the
government has the option of protecting its interests through
innovative contract terms and reliance on backup satellite and
launch arrangements.

Our recent suborbital flight test provides such an example.
AMROC built and integrated a payload for a U.S.  government
customer, and made provisions to carry it on its test flight,
entirely on a pay-on-success basis.  Thus, when the launch did
not take place, the government incurred no financial loss
whatsoever from the failure.  Had the contract been made on a
traditional basis, the government would have suffered a loss.
There are many opportunities throughout the range of government
space activityto encourage the development of new and innovative
space launch technologies without exposing the taxpayers to
undue risk, and to broaden the range of flight opportunities as
well.

The U.S.  launch industry needs to move beyond the traditional
set of practices used to guarentee vehicle reliability.  Our
experience indicates that these measures are of limited utility
in any event; most of the problems we encountered in preparing
our test vehicle for launch were from components derived from
traditional aerospace sources of supply; the
industrially-derived components tended to be more robust and
reliable.  The natural outcome of the move from
government-derived practices to a commercial practice would be
the evolution of commercial launch industry standards and
practices, drawing on the tradition aerospace and current
innovative experiences.  This would be similar to the current
SAE and ASME standards in various industries, and should be
developed as cooperative effort by industry and professional
organizations, with appropriate input from government agencies.
As it evolves, the existence of these standards would help
resolve the dilemma of what to substitute for MILSPEC
approaches.

Reviewing HR 2674, we consider it to be an appropriate basis for
legislation moving the U.S.  to truly commercial procurement of
launch services.  We believe it is important to enact
legislation which would send a strong signal to potential
investors in the U.S.  space transportation industry that the
government will help, rather than compete with our industry.  In
addition, only legislation gives the average procurement officer
in the trenches the comfot he needs to cut a commercial
contract.  Bear in mind that procurement officers get punished
for deviations from customary practice far more frequently than
they get rewarded for innovations benefiting the taxpayers.

Regarding specific provisions of the legislation, I would urge
you not to bind the President's hands in international trade
negotiations.  To give foreign subsidized competitors access to
U.S.  government launch service markets before we have concluded
trade negotiations to open overseas markets is short-sighted.
Access to U.S.  markets is an important bargaining chip, and
should not be given up gratuitously.

Also, care should be taken in specifying competitive procurement
practices for all government-funded launch purchases.  This
wording could encumber ro prevent implementation of a voucher
program for space researchers along the lines of tht studied by
NASA and the DOT last year.  The voucher program is one of the
most promising approaches to using private space transportation
to benefit space research.  Any clause mandating competitive
procurement should carry a clause permitting a voucher program
to operate without undue red tape.

Finally, government has another role, in fostering long-term
research and development to aid the commercial launch industry
in remaining competitive.  Here we again urge that government
research not compete with private efforts.  We have added a new
space propulsion system to America's space technology base on
private financing.  If this effort is undercut by
taxpayer-funded research it sends a powerful negative message to
future investors in technology development.  We urge that
research and development contracts be reviewed for conflict with
prior private research as a matter of course.

In conclusion, the United States has moved closer over the past
decade to making the transition from a politically-driven,
centralized system of space transportation development and
operations to a market-driven, commercial, and innovative
system.  As a result of the opportunities created by this
evolution, AMROC has been able to finance and develop a new
technology for space transportation entirely on private funding.
Given that continued progress toward commercialization is made,
we anticipate being able to build on the technology base we have
established to date and establish a firm position in a
thriving U.S. space tranportation industry.

In order for this to happen, it is essential that Congress and
the Administration build on the strong beginning, to complete
the transition and give our industry the conditions it needs to
compete in the highly competitive international arena.  I urge
the passage of H.R. 2674 and other measures which will be
needed to shepherd this transition, and I urge the continued
vigilance of Congress to insure that the policies set forth by
existing legislation do not fall prey to burequcratic inertia
and special interests.  Given this help, I am confident that
AMROC and others of our industry will prevail over our temporary
difficulties and setbacks and keep America on the road to the
stars.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Allen W. Sherzer                    |  Is the local cluster the result   |
|  aws@iti.org                        |  of gerrymandering?                |
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Date: Fri, 8 Dec 89 12:22:34 PST
From: Peter Scott <pjs@aristotle.Jpl.Nasa.Gov>
Subject: Re: Manned vs Unmanned Mission to Mars

thorin!homer!leech@mcnc.org  (Jonathan Leech) writes:

>In article <1989Dec5.233637.7389@utzoo.uucp> henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) writes:
>>[...]
>>Entirely true.  You need to fix such systems promptly, or at least
>>improvise a temporary kludge.	As was done on Apollo 13, and to some
>>extent on Skylab.
>
>    While I generally agree with Henry, Apollo 13 was definitely a
>case of "more luck than planning," too.  Luck that their "temporary
>kludge" was still attached to the CSM instead of left behind on the
>Moon.

I disagree.  Even though the Apollo XIII astronauts said that if they
had been given the same situation that they faced in space in the
simulator, they would have complained that the testers were not being
realistic, the possibility of using the LM as a lifeboat was one that
had been considered and researched (albeit somewhat thinly) before.

Peter Scott (pjs@grouch.jpl.nasa.gov)

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End of SPACE Digest V10 #325
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